New AuditLogger writes one JSON line per firewall action to
<projectRoot>/.gnoma/sessions/<sessionID>/audit.jsonl so a user can
grep 'what did the firewall do this session?' after the fact.
Records 'block', 'redact', 'warn', and 'unicode_sanitize' events with
the matcher name, source (tool_result / message_text / etc.), and
token length. Discipline: never the bytes themselves — only the
matcher name and the length, matching the README's scope-note
promise about audit data.
Plumbing:
- Firewall gains an audit *AuditLogger field plus SetAudit setter.
The firewall is constructed before the session ID exists, so the
audit logger is wired post-hoc once main.go has the sessionID.
- Honours incognito: Record is a silent no-op when the firewall's
IncognitoMode is active, preserving the no-persistence contract.
- Tolerant of fs errors: mkdir / open / encode failures log a Warn
but never propagate; the scan pipeline must not depend on audit
succeeding.
- Nil receiver is a valid no-op so callers don't need nil-guards
around every Record.
Tracks 'Security boundary — per-session audit log' from the
v0.3.0 r/SideProject launch thread (u/Secret_Theme3192,
2026-05-24). Per-host egress allowlist remains separately tracked
pending the commenter's reply on host-level vs per-tool semantics.
Add a deterministic pre-extractor that skips known-safe token shapes
before they reach the entropy scorer. Targets the false-positive
regime that bites under lowered entropy_threshold or
redact_high_entropy = true — UUIDs (~3.4 bits), SHA hex digests
(~3.9 bits), ISO-8601 timestamps, and HTTP(S) URLs.
Config knob lives under the existing security section to match
entropy_threshold / redact_high_entropy convention:
[security]
entropy_safelist = ["uuid", "sha_hex", "iso8601", "url"]
Empty / unset preserves pre-F-1 behaviour exactly — users opt in.
Per-pattern Debug telemetry fires on every skip (pattern name +
token length, never the token bytes). This is the data F-2's
go/no-go gate depends on; the plan literally specifies it.
NewFirewall validates names at the config boundary and emits a
Warn for unknown entries so a typo like "uid" instead of "uuid"
surfaces loudly instead of silently disabling FP reduction.
Tests cover: UUID/SHA-1/SHA-256 skipped at lowered threshold,
mixed payload (safe shape + real secret) preserves the secret,
secret-adjacent-to-UUID regression guard, empty safelist preserves
pre-F-1 behaviour, unknown name silently dropped at scanner level
but warned at firewall level, end-to-end FirewallConfig wiring,
and the skip-telemetry log line.
F-2 remains gated on real-workload FP-rate observations.
- M2: stop echoing the matched pattern name in the user-visible
[BLOCKED: ...] message returned by the firewall. The pattern (and
the matched secret class) still appear in the operator log, but the
string sent back into the prompt is now generic.
- H1: document Rule.Pattern semantics on the Rule type and pin them
with a regression test. Pattern is a case-sensitive, exact substring
match against the JSON-serialised tool arguments — not a glob,
regex, or whitespace-insensitive match. The new test exercises both
matches and the documented gotchas (double-space, case drift, tab).
- H3: every code path in CommandExecutor.Execute that converts a hook
failure into Allow via FailOpen now emits a WARN naming the hook
and the failure mode (timeout / launch_error / parse_error), so
chronic hook failure or abuse is visible in operator logs.
Also tightens errcheck on permission/rule.go (Printer.Print on a
strings.Builder cannot error in practice; make the intent explicit).
provider/openai:
- Fix doubled tool call args (argsComplete flag): Ollama sends complete
args in the first streaming chunk then repeats them as delta, causing
doubled JSON and 400 errors in elfs
- Handle fs: prefix (gemma4 uses fs:grep instead of fs.grep)
- Add Reasoning field support for Ollama thinking output
cmd/gnoma:
- Early TTY detection so logger is created with correct destination
before any component gets a reference to it (fixes slog WARN bleed
into TUI textarea)
permission:
- Exempt spawn_elfs and agent tools from safety scanner: elf prompt
text may legitimately mention .env/.ssh/credentials patterns and
should not be blocked
tui/app:
- /init retry chain: no-tool-calls → spawn_elfs nudge → write nudge
(ask for plain text output) → TUI fallback write from streamBuf
- looksLikeAgentsMD + extractMarkdownDoc: validate and clean fallback
content before writing (reject refusals, strip narrative preambles)
- Collapse thinking output to 3 lines; ctrl+o to expand (live stream
and committed messages)
- Stream-level filter for model pseudo-tool-call blocks: suppresses
<<tool_code>>...</tool_code>> and <<function_call>>...<tool_call|>
from entering streamBuf across chunk boundaries
- sanitizeAssistantText regex covers both block formats
- Reset streamFilterClose at every turn start
vikingowl